

Conflicting Nationalisms

A long-lasting stereotype depicts the Balkans as the ‘gunpowder barrel’ of Europe. National conflicts between petty and greedy states are part of this picture. This image was shaped during the late 19th–early 20th centuries, and was ‘proven right’ by the experience of the Balkan Wars and by the Sarajevo assassination in 1914. Yet, this crude historical image is to a large extent unfair. World War I started with the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, but it certainly did not become the global massacre we all know because of the people from this region. Besides, Southeast Europe is low down on the list of horrors committed in the 20th century. Yet, this does not absolve Southeast European nationalisms from their responsibility in generating useless conflicts and horrible crimes.

It is not the purpose of this teaching pack to illustrate the horrors of national conflicts in Southeast Europe. In fact, we have tried to avoid this, and focused more on showing the arguments and ideologies which at a first glance might seem legitimate, but which ultimately motivated people to act in violent manners. We think that the critical discussion of such sources in history classes will help young people become mature and responsible citizens.

It was also our aim in this chapter to show that national conflicts do not last forever. In fact, the historical experience of Southeast Europe, and even more, those of other European regions, clearly prove that conflicts do end, that national prejudices and hatred can be replaced by more positive attitudes, and that a better and safer world can and does emerge. The rise of the European Union and the example of French-German relations during the last five decades are encouraging. Similar improvements can be already seen in parts of Southeast Europe. Such evolutions do not necessarily mean that the nation-state will disappear or will become irrelevant. In spite of all expectations that the nation-state would fade away, it is now obvious that, at least for a significant time span, the nation-state will continue to be a major actor in European politics and worldwide. National identification will remain significant during our lifetime, and the evolutions of nation-states will influence our existence. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to ensure that our nation-states turn out to be favourable frameworks for our common future.

IVa. Ideologies involved in mobilising for conflict

IV-1. National prejudice against Germans in Croatia (1866)

I could never love a German blonde. Once, by ill-fate, I met such a German angel of eternal peace. We proved our mutual love, and then that German girl started to play *Les cloches du monastere* for me and I started to yawn; then she started to read *Bergruine* by Matheson and I took a nap. She sighed, that blonde, for a half-hour daily, during the seven days. On the eighth day, I was no longer there. I love Croa-

tian she-devils, with whom a man can fight, more than the pale German Lujza, half-hearted as tepid lemonade.

Senoa, p. 164.



What does the author think of German girls? Is it true? Do you know of other prejudices about other people? To which nation or social group are most jokes in your community related? What is, according to your opinion, the role of stereotypes and prejudices? Do they have any real basis?

IV-2. The memories of Dr. Riza Nur about his refusal to marry a foreign girl (1910)

We were attending Parliament. At that time, I had many marriage proposals. One of the candidates was very rich and beautiful. The girl herself was very willing and trying hard. My heart was about to slide towards her. She was Albanian. Only because of that I did not marry her. I said "I need a Turk. Until now we have not had any other blood in our family".

Nur, p.318.



How can you explain the attitude of the writer? What do you think of his decision?

IV-3. Divergence on the Greek Megale Idea – a discussion between Professor Nikolaos Saripolos and King George I (1877)

[...] one State with Constantinople as the capital, including under Your Majesty's sceptre, in addition to Crete, Thessaly and Epirus, Thrace, Macedonia, the Black Sea up near Trebizond, Asia Minor and all islands of the Aegean, without omitting my own country, Cyprus... "You are extending the borders of Greece too far", the King interrupted me.

Politis, p.63.



Nikolaos Saripolos (1817-1887), law expert, scholar and Professor at the University of Athens, describes in his *Memories*, a discussion he had with King George I (1863-1913) in 1877, where he explained his views about the territories claimed by Greece.



Why do you think the King interrupted the discussion? What was the author intending to explain to the King?

IV-4. Definition of the Romanian national space by the historian Alexandru D. Xenopol (1888)

The first shortcoming of our geographic position

is therefore that, as compared to the Latin nations, which make Western Europe similar to a continent, we, the Eastern Latins, are like an island lost in an ocean of foreign people.

And because of this, since fate wanted to throw the Romanian people on the northern side of the Danube, it lives nowadays on a wide territory of 300000 sq km, almost as big as Italy's entire surface and larger than half of that of France, enclosed in between three big rivers, which margin a triangular shape. These rivers are the Danube in the south, the Dniester as an eastern border and the great tributary of the Danube, the river Tisa, as western border. In this region the Romanians form - almost everywhere - a compact people, who also consider some of the islands over the borders, shown above, as their own.

Xenopol, I, p.43.



Alexandru D. Xenopol (1847-1920) was one of the leading Romanian scholars of humanities during the late 19th century. He published extensively on various topics, but acquired national and European recognition with his contributions to Romanian history and the theory of history. He authored the first multi-volume synthesis of Romanian history.



How are Romanian identity and the Romanian national space represented?
Do you think that the representations of national space have ideological and political goals?
Do you know of any situations when several nations claimed the same territories? Exemplify.

IV-5. National divisions in the Ottoman parliament (1908-1914)

The Unionists [Young Turks] in their attacks against us were claiming that we united with non-Turks and foreign elements, who were traitors to the homeland. This was totally in contradiction with reality and a lie. It is true that the opposition had Turks, Arabs, Albanians, Greeks, and Armenians in its ranks, but these elements were also among the Unionists. In fact, the majority of them were Unionist [...] it was

possible to dislodge the Unionists with a strong organisation, in a legal way. The Arabs at the time were intent on establishing an Arab party. It was necessary to incorporate this into the Babylonian Tower to engulf it. The Babylonian Tower is no minus because the Unionists are like that too. In fact, the whole country is like that, so what can you do? Of course its parliament will be like this. The Arabs sport very dangerous nationalistic ideas. If a precedent is established, the end will be grim. It will be like the Parliament of Austria. The Greeks, too, if not openly but implicitly support this idea [...]. I, myself, am ready to die for Turkdom but I hide this like a secret. I do not talk about this to anybody. If we do it [speak of Turkish nationalism] openly, the others, too, will have legitimate ground to come out in the open. This, in turn, means the partition of the country and its extinction. The homeland (*vatan*) stretches all the way from Shkoder to Basra and the Yemen. There are seventy-two and a half elements in it. This situation was the weakest side of Turkey and the greatest danger threatening it. That is why I was shivering with the thought of the establishment of national parties. At that time, despite the fact that he himself was an Albanian, Huseyin Cahid wrote articles about the 'dominant nation' against the Greeks in the Tanin.

It is true that he did not mention Turkdom by name but using the term 'dominant nation' was not acceptable in a constitutional regime. I was infuriated about the crazy attitude of this man and I said "He is doing this either on purpose, or ambition has blinded his eyes with a thick and black curtain of ignorance. He is unable to see what kind of enormous harm he is preparing for the state." Actually speaking of the 'dominant nation' was not right as the country was composed of many different nations [*millet*]. Otherwise, there could be no constitutionalism. It would be a different matter if Turkey governed these areas as colonies with special laws. Then, they could not be elected as deputies. Anyway, Turkey had no such power [...]. The Greeks became truly mad. They were up against a dominant nation. These articles were like flames started in a powder box. I wish he used Turkey instead of the dominant nation. He did not say it, he could not say it [...]. Never mind,

I have attempted to gather the opposition groups. I was talking to the important deputies. The Arabs did not want to unite in a general party. Abdalhamid Zohrawi led this group. I was on friendly terms with Shukri Asali, the MP for Damascus. He was a naive person. He disclosed his ideas to me. I did not inhibit him. His idea was to establish an Umayyad state in Damascus [...]. I threatened these Arabs: "if you establish an Arab party we shall establish a Turkish party and we shall unite with the Unionists. Then you will see who is going to be harmed". They were frightened. They accepted my idea. The People's Party too did not want to join due to the encouragement of Gumulcineli. I did whatever I could and persuaded them too.

Nur, pp.328-332.



How can we understand the problems raised in the text? What ideological changes and political attitudes bothered and worried the author, in your opinion?

IV-6. Proclamations of the anti-colonial struggle by the Greek Cypriots (1955)

A.

With the help of God, with faith in our honourable struggle, with the support of all Hellenism and the help of the Cypriots, WE HAVE TAKEN UP THE STRUGGLE TO THROW OFF THE BRITISH YOKE, taking as our battle cry that which our ancestors have handed down to us as a sacred trust: DEATH OR VICTORY.

BROTHER CYPRIOTS

From the depths of the past, all those who glorified Greek history in preserving their freedom are looking to us: the warriors of Marathon and of Salamis; the 300 of Leonidas and the fighters in the epic Albanian war. The fighters of 1821 are looking to us, those fighters who showed us that liberation from the yoke of the ruler is always won through National States [...]

All Hellenism is looking to us and following us with concern but also with national pride.

Let us reply with deeds and show that we are worthy of them.

It is time we let the world know that international diplomacy is UNJUST and in many words COWARDLY and that the Cypriot spirit is brave. If our rulers refuse to give us back our freedom we are capable of claiming it with our own HANDS and with our own BLOOD.

Let us show the world once more that the neck of the contemporary Greek refuses to accept the yoke. Our struggle will be hard. The ruler has the means and is strong in number.

We have the SPIRIT. We have JUSTICE on our own side. That is why WE SHALL WIN.

DIPLOMATS OF THE WORLD

Look to your deeds. It is shameful that in the twentieth century people should have to shed blood for freedom, the divine gift for which we too fought at your side and for which you, at least, claim that you fought against Nazism and Fascism.

GREEKS

Wherever you may be, hear our call:

FORWARD! ALL TOGETHER FOR THE FREEDOM OF CYPRUS. [...]

THE LEADER
DIGHENIS

Grivas-Dighenis, p.34.

B.

APRIL 1st

RISE CHILDREN OF GREECE TO LIBERATE THE COUNTRY

A handful of besieged people against an Empire of 500 million subjects, armed with their SOULS and accompanied by FAITH, is striking resounding blows at the mighty Goliath who is armed with material power. This is a fight of JUSTICE, which generates MORAL POWERS and inspires the noblest ideals, against INJUSTICE and violence.

[...]

We have won a moral victory. An Empire is shaken and humiliated. Cyprus, unknown to many, even to diplomats, is today at the international forefront, a nuisance to the Anglo-Americans and a carcinoma to the English. All liberal peoples are on our side.

[...]

The age of capitulating is gone. Gone is the time of living at the expense of the small and the powerless. Today, JUSTICE and MORALITY shall prevail. Neither the vile Anglo-American alliance against us nor the Anglo-Turkish collusion — the coercive creation of two crafty opportunists — can defeat us.

Papageorgiou, pp.138-139.



The two proclamations were issued by Colonel (later General) George Grivas (1898-1974), who, after having served in the Greek army, returned to Cyprus to head EOKA, and launched a guerrilla campaign against the British with the ultimate goal of freeing Cyprus from the colonial rule and to unite it with Greece. For the outcome of this struggle, see also text I-39.



How does the leader of the Cypriot movement justify the struggle for liberation? Do you know of any other anti-colonialist movements of the 1950s?

Compare with texts I-8 and I-22. What is the purpose of a proclamation in general? Take a sheet of paper and organise it into three columns. For each text, answer the following questions, always bearing in mind that a proclamation is foremost an act of communication:

Who wrote it? To who was it addressed? When was it created and under what circumstances?

Write down the arguments used to justify the struggle for liberation. What do you observe? Do you think that a proclamation should respect specific rhetorical rules in order to achieve its goals?

IVb. Concrete conflicts

IV-7. Stjepan Radic, *We want our Croatian Country within the Yugoslav Unity* (1918)

With you [the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro], we want to have the unique outer international state frontier, [...] but, in addition to that, we want to keep our inner Croatian state frontier out of it for these reasons:

First, we the Croats, want to ensure that our peasant people are given their complete rights according to our specific conditions and needs. [...]

Second, we the Croats, want to arrange our Croatian country not only on a peasant but also a Slavic basis, for example, by replacing German by the Czech language and by trying to transfer and transplant all the Czech regulations and laws which are good for us. You, on the contrary, are transferring regulations and laws from the foreign, (albeit more progressive world); so we won't argue with you fruitlessly and remain an everlasting minority in all matters.

Third, we the Croats, have the intention of arranging our public life based on Christian and Wilson's human basis so that we set aside any hate and revenge, and you, brother Serbs, on the contrary, due to your great suffering, [...] and on account of your heroism, you consider yourselves the first nation not only among the Slavs but in the whole world. We appreciate your heroism but that pride of yours would be a great obstacle in learning from everybody, especially from the Slavic nations.

Radic, p.211.



Stjepan Radic (1871-1928) – a political leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, was the leading Croatian politician after World War I, killed in Parliament in Belgrade for opposing the dominant Serbian politics. He wrote this article immediately after the downfall of Austria-Hungary and on the eve of unification of the South-Slav countries in 1918.



Why does Radic ask for Croatian independence ("within the Yugoslav unity")? Is he in favour of

independence at all costs? What do you think of his ideology (peasant Republic, Slavism)? Are these ideologies of topical interest today?

IV-8. Statement of the Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks (1943)

Today the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through their only political representative, the State antifascist Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, want their country, which is not Serbian, Croatian or Muslim, but Serbian, and Croatian and Muslim, to be a free and united Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the full equality and similarity will be ensured. The nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina want to participate equally with other nations in the building of a national democratic federal Yugoslavia.

Colakovic, p.17.



What is the opinion expressed in the text about the character of the state?

IV-9. Declaration of the First Antifascist Assembly for the liberation of the Macedonian People (1944)

Declaration of ASNOM about the basic rights of the citizens of democratic Macedonia:

1. All citizens of the federal democratic Macedonian state are equal before the law, regardless of their nationality, sex, race and religion.
2. The national minorities have every right to free national life.
3. Every citizen is guaranteed the security of his person and property, the right to ownership and private initiative in economic life.
4. Every citizen is guaranteed freedom of religion and conscience.
5. All citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly, association.

6. The elective right of democratic Macedonia is to be practiced by secret ballot on the basis of general, equal, direct and personal voting right.
7. The right to be elected in all electoral bodies of the people's government belongs to every male and female citizen above 18 years of age who is not under juridical investigation. While the people's liberating struggle lasts, and under the decision of ASNOM, there can be a renouncement of the principle of secret and direct voting.
Retarded persons, as well as persons accused of being against the interests of the peoples' liberating struggle, are deprived of the rights under point 5 and 6 of this declaration.
8. It is a duty and honour of every capable citizen, regardless of nationality and faith, to participate as a soldier in the ranks of the peoples' liberating army and the partisan units.
9. All fascist and pro-fascist actions are forbidden because they are against the freedom and independence of the fraternal community of the peoples of Yugoslavia.
10. Every citizen is guaranteed the right to appeal against the decisions of the organs of the government in a way prescribed by the law. Every citizen has the right to appeal and complain to all of the state authorities.
11. The people's government takes efforts to eliminate illiteracy and to elevate popular culture and to secure free education.

In the Monastery of St. Prohor Pchinski, on Ilinden (St. Elijah's day), 2 August 1944

Makedonium, pp.119-120.



The Declaration for the basic rights of the citizens of democratic Macedonia was issued by the First Assembly of ASNOM (Antifascist Assembly for the liberation of the Macedonian people), on 2 August 1944. This Communist dominated Assembly, the political body of the partisan movement that was fighting the

German and Bulgarian forces in Macedonia, set out the ground for the autonomous Macedonian federal unit within the framework of the projected Yugoslav common state of equal peoples. As such, it was clearly the founding moment of the future independent Macedonian state. The partisan leaders specifically chose the day of proclamation of the Macedonian state - 2 August, the day of St. Elias, the day of the Ilinden Uprising in 1903. In this way, the mythology of the 'Second Ilinden' was created, stressing the continuity of the armed struggle.

Many of these solemn democratic articles, however, remained mere proclamations since, after all, Yugoslavia – and the People's Republic of Macedonia within it – became a totalitarian political system of the Communist type.

IV-10. The difficulties of the anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus (1955-1959), analysed by the leader of EOKA, George Grivas (Dighenis)

There were many powerful actors who put obstacles in my way. These were (a) the English, with the intimidation they practiced and the restrictive measures they imposed on the young through their control of elementary education; (b) the parents, who feared for their children's lives; (c) the teachers, out of concern for the effect on school discipline and the education of their students; (d) the communists, who wanted to get young people on their side in the exclusive interests of the Party; (e) certain people in power, who could not understand what use the young and, in particular, school students, would be in a liberation struggle which took the form of an armed conflict.


Grivas-Dighenis, pp.38-39.



Analyse every argument that the leader of the anti-colonial struggle identifies as being an obstacle to the organisation of the struggle.

What is the attitude in your society towards the involvement of youngsters in politics? (Think about your family, teachers, friends, and society in general). To what extent do you consider young people should be involved in politics? What about in armed conflicts?

► v29. Cyprus' appeals to the United Nations (1950s)



Cartoon by Ph.Demetriades in *Istoria tis Kyprou*, p.243.



During the anti-colonial struggle, Greek governments representing the Greek Cypriot community submitted four appeals to the UN advocating the right to self-determination for Cyprus. In 1958, the appeal rephrased the demand from self-determination to 'independence'.



Translation:
Washington, Lord Byron and Jeanne d'Arc:
"So, were all of our struggles in vain?"



Why have these three personalities been chosen by the author? What nations do they represent? What struggles do they refer to?

IV-11. The perspective of the Greek Cypriot left wing party (AKEL²⁷), 1955

From time to time, EOKA and Dighenis babble strange and weird things according to the American correspondent who "interviewed" him. The correspondent also implied that Dighenis was trained to be a commando by the English. Therefore, in the last announcement of EOKA that was broadcast by the Athens radio station, Dighenis claimed that if the

²⁷ AKEL: Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou (The Progressive Party of the Working People).

UN refused to enquire on the issue of Cyprus, then the Cypriots "would blow up the island by making it a holocaust and by burning both themselves and the British." By this announcement EOKA, Dighenis and their prompters acknowledge some noteworthy facts:

- 1) That the issue of Cyprus depends on the UN. Then what is the meaning of the fiery words and the fuss they raise around these things? They admit that their aim is not to make English noses bleed.
- 2) Therefore, since the Cyprus issue depends on the UN, why does EOKA admit that their

abandonment by the Athenians, who were “enslaved” to foreigners, was an open and despicable act of betrayal?

- 3) In the UN, as it happened last year too, the Americans abandoned and betrayed us while the USSR voted for us. Isn't it again criminal that we remain stacked, like oysters, by those who betray us and sell us by offering us military bases?
- 4) Since, as EOKA admits, the issue of Cyprus will be solved by the UN, isn't it obvious that the best defence will be through the united presence of the whole Cypriot people, which, however, EOKA fights off?

All the above show that EOKA, in the best case scenario, is politically misled and as a result is acting with adventurism. We believe that the solution to the Cyprus issue stands first of all in the unity and the struggle of the Cypriot people and Greece. This is the main and primary concern and all the rest will follow. The massive political strike on 2 August in Cyprus, which was an aggressive demonstration of the unity of the people, proved that the patriots are on the right path. Let the people continue, more decisively, their struggle for unity and fight for their national rights. And the victory will be theirs, despite and against all resistance, opposition and attempt at division.”

The *New Democrat* newspaper, 7 August 1955, in Sp.Papageorgiou, *AKEL*.



EOKA: Ethniki Enosis Kyprion Agoniston (= National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) was a secret right-wing organisation that led the anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus from 1955 to 1959. EOKA's aim to unite Cyprus with Greece excluded Turkish Cypriots whose leadership chose co-operation with the British. A secret Turkish Cypriot organisation led by Turkish army officers - named Volkan and renamed 'TMT' (Turkish Defence Force) in 1958 - was also created with the aim of maintaining the existing status quo. EOKA's right wing political orientation ended in clashes with Greek Cypriot leftists, namely the supporters of AKEL, a party that had won many of the local authority elections in previous decades – the only elections permitted by the British administration.

IV-12. Turkish Cypriots against EOKA, 1960

THE TERRORIST STRUGGLE OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS CONTINUES.

Five dead in ten days!

Makarios²⁸ must condemn these acts.

EOKA's intentions are made clear in a prominent way: The population shall be terrified and the terror campaign will continue in full strength. There is no doubt that whoever plans this will face the same consequences.

The EOKA terrorist organisation has again launched its deadly campaign in the first months of the Republic. Those terrorist acts were stopped after the Zurich and London agreements.

The operation of the EOKA fighters who are struggling to unite Cyprus with Greece was first directed with rough voices towards killing and terrifying and then smoothly towards *Enosis* (“Union”). In order to achieve its purposes, EOKA has clearly created this terrorist campaign, along with stating the necessity for unity and cooperation among the Greek-Cypriots. Without exception and without hesitation, every Greek that opposes and betrays EOKA and doesn't believe in its grand ambitions, shall be riddled with holes from EOKA bullets and, as in the past, shall be burned, kidnapped and tortured.

The Turkish community shall never forget the actions against itself as well as the terrorist operations it has undergone on behalf of this organisation in order to achieve its grand ambitions. From this point of view, the Turks of Cyprus are well aware of

²⁸ Makarios III (1913-1977) studied in Cyprus, Athens and Boston and returned to Cyprus in 1948. Upon the death of Makarios II, he became, at the age of 37, the youngest Archbishop of Cyprus (1950). He was sentenced to exile in the Seychelles, by the British, from 1956 to 1957. He was elected the first President of the independent Republic of Cyprus (elections of 13 December 1959) and in 1961 he made the young Republic a member of the Non-aligned Movement. On 15 July 1974, a coup d'état, prepared by the Greek military junta, overthrew Makarios, who escaped and was flown to London. The Turkish invasions of 20 July and 15 August and the division of the island followed. Makarios returned to Cyprus in December 1974 and died on 3 August, 1977.

the importance and the actual aim of these terror operations.

The Turkish Cypriots will respond to these operations, which are not a good sign for the future of the Republic of Cyprus, with strong dislike.

Makarios must condemn these acts of the terrorists who have chosen death and fear. The posts that have been occupied necessitate this.

Nacak newspaper²⁹, 73, October 7th 1960.



After the first inter-communal violence in 1958, under British rule, which led to a small displacement of Greek Cypriots, negotiations began between Ankara and Athens, which led to the Zurich/London agreements of 1959. Under these, the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 as an independent state under the guarantee of Britain, Greece and Turkey. British strategic interests were secured by two sovereign bases on the island, while the presence of Greece and Turkey was assured by the stationing of contingents of 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers. Greek Cypriots were divided in their attitude towards the agreements while Turkish Cypriots supported the Constitution, which was not submitted to referendums. Both communities accused each other of holding arms stocks and of creating unofficial armed bands: in one instance, prior to independence, the British were able to capture a ship, the 'Deniz', which was bringing arms to the island.

After two years of increasing tension, in December 1963, a serious constitutional dispute created an atmosphere in which violent inter-communal clashes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots broke out. A dividing line, known as the *Green Line* that ran across Nicosia, was subsequently drawn in January 1964. In 1963-64, a large displacement of population, over-

²⁹ *Nacak* (Axe) was a weekly newspaper published from 1959 to 1963. It was published by Raouf Denktash, an ambitious nationalist politician since the 1950s, who supported the 'Turkishness' of Turkish Cypriots. Opposed to the more moderate policy of the first Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, Fazil Kuchuk, he was elected President of the Turkish Communal Chamber in 1960. During the inter-community clashes, he fled to Turkey (1963/4-1967). He represented Turkish Cypriots at the inter-community discussions held under the auspices of the UN from 1968 onwards. He became the leader of the Turkish Cypriots and remained so in 2003 when he was instrumental in rejecting the third version of the Annan Plan.

whelmingly Turkish-Cypriot, took place. Nevertheless, about 50% of Turkish Cypriots continued to live among Greek Cypriots until July 1974, when, following the Greek junta-organized coup against the internationally recognized government and the Turkish military intervention which followed, 165,000 Greek Cypriots lost their homes to the advancing Turkish army. The loss of life was also far greater than before. In 1975, the British government allowed 8,000 Turkish Cypriots who had taken refuge in their sovereign bases to move to the area under Turkish control. This consolidated the process of physical separation between communities that had, until 1958, been integrated, in approximately equivalent percentages, throughout the island. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots became separated from one another and, in their own land, there were very many displaced persons in both communities.



Compare texts IV-10, IV-11 and IV-12 and try to understand the three different positions presented. Refer also to texts I-39 and IV-6.

IV-13. The goals of the Croatian Spring of the early 1970s remembered by the writer Vlado Gotovac

Who comes to a prison as an innocent can expect nothing. He can only wait [...].

I have represented the dream of Croatian statehood; this dream has to be realised so that we can put it aside and move on with our common destiny in the world. Because, to me, the state is nothing but an unavoidable evil. It isn't any different in the case of the Croatian state. But it has to be accomplished as an internal question! Only then, will this long-lasting desire disappear [...] and then we will start to dream another dream – the dream against it [the state].

Gotovac, pp. 129, 159.



At the end of the 1960's, Croatia was ruled by relatively young Communist administrators, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar and Miko Tripalo. They tried to achieve a greater degree of independence for Croatia within Yugoslavia. They also proclaimed some demo-

cratic freedoms, but within the framework of the existing Communist government. The popular name of this movement was “The Croatian Spring”, and less popular was “The Mass Movement”. The movement had many followers, especially students. The movement was brought to an end in the early 1970’s. Dabčević-Kučar and Tripalo were removed by a decision from Tito. Many people who supported the movement, especially intellectuals, were imprisoned. One of the prisoners was writer Vlado Gotovac. He spent four years in the notorious prison of Stara Gradiska.



What did the author mean by saying “to me the state is nothing but an unavoidable evil”? What do you think of the paradox that an enemy of any state was imprisoned for fighting for the Croatian state? Is the nation-state a necessary stage in doing away with the state in general?

IV–14. The memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) (1986)

There is a deep concern in Yugoslavia because of stagnating social development, economic difficulties, growing social tensions, and open inter-ethnic clashes. A serious crisis has engulfed not only the political and economic arenas, but Yugoslavia’s entire system of law and order as well. Idleness and irresponsibility at work, corruption and nepotism, a lack of confidence in and a disregard for the law, bureaucratic obstinacy, growing mistrust among individuals, and increasingly arrogant individual and group egoism have become daily phenomena. The resulting blow to moral values and to the reputation of leading public institutions and a lack of faith in the competence of decision-makers have spread apathy and bitterness among the public and produced alienation from all the mainstays and symbols of law and order. An objective examination of Yugoslav reality suggests that the present crisis may end in social shocks with unforeseeable consequences, including such a catastrophic eventuality as the fragmentation of the Yugoslav state. No one can close his eyes to what is happening and to what may happen.

[...] [In communist Yugoslavia] the solution to the national question was formulated and developed theoretically by Sperans (Kardelj³⁰) in his book “Razvoj slovenskoga narodnoga vprsanja” (The Development of the Slovene National Question), which generally served as the ideological model for Yugoslav development in the direction of a confederation of sovereign republics and autonomous regions, which was finally achieved by the Constitution of 1974.

The two most developed republics³¹, which achieved their national programmes with this Constitution, are now the most ardent defenders of the existing system. Thanks to the political position of their leaders at the centres of political power, they have held (both before and after the decisive years of the 1960s) the initiative in all matters affecting the political and economic system. They modelled the social and economic structure of Yugoslavia to suit their own desires and needs.

[...] Considering the existing forms of national discrimination, present-day Yugoslavia cannot be considered a democratic state.

[...] Yugoslavia is seen less as a community of citizens, nations and nationalities all equal before the law, and more as a community of eight equal territories. But even this variety of equality does not apply to Serbia because of its special legal and political position which reflects the tendency to keep the Serbian nation under constant supervision. The guiding principle behind this policy has been ‘a weak Serbia, a strong Yugoslavia’ and this has evolved into an influential mind-set: if rapid economic growth were permitted to the Serbs, who are the largest nation, it would pose a danger to the other nations of Yugoslavia. And so, all possibilities are grasped to place increasing obstacles in the way of their economic development and political consolidation. One of the most serious of such obstacles is Serbia’s

³⁰ Edward Kardelj (1910-1979) was a Slovenian schoolteacher who joined the Communist movement, becoming one of the leading statesmen of Communist Yugoslavia. He was the main ideologue of Titoism, and attempted to strengthen the Yugoslavian federalism.

³¹ Slovenia and Croatia.

present undefined constitutional position, so full of internal conflicts.

[...]Relations between Serbia and the provinces³² cannot be reduced solely or even primarily to a formal legal interpretation of two constitutions³³. It is primarily a matter of the Serbian nation and their state. A nation that regained statehood after a long and bloody struggle, that achieved civil democracy, and that lost two and half million kinsmen in two world wars³⁴ has undergone the experience of having a bureaucratically constructed party commission determine that, after four decades in the new Yugoslavia, it alone was condemned to be without its own state. A more bitter historic defeat in peacetime cannot be imagined.

[...] The question of the Serbian people's position is given considerable weight by the fact that a large number of Serbians live outside Serbia, especially Serbia proper, and that their number is larger than the total number of people of some other nations. According to the census of 1981, 24% of the Serbian people (1,958,000) live outside of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, which is considerably more than the number of Slovenians, Albanians, Macedonians, and taken individually, almost the same as the Muslims.

[...] Complete national and cultural integrity of the Serbian people is their historic and democratic right, no matter in which republic or province they might find themselves living.

[...] In order to satisfy Serbia's legitimate interests, a revision of the constitution is unavoidable. The autonomous provinces must become true integral parts of the Republic of Serbia by granting them a degree of autonomy that would not destroy the integrity of the Republic and would make it possible to act in the common interests of the wider community. The unhappy matter of Serbian statehood is not the only deficiency that must be corrected by constitutional amendments. The 1974 constitution turned

³² Kosovo and Vojvodina.

³³ Constitutions of Federal Yugoslavia and of the Republic of Serbia.

³⁴ The number of Serbian casualties in the two World Wars is highly controversial.

Yugoslavia into a very unstable state community, prone to consider alternatives other than the Yugoslav alternative, as has been made clear in recent statements by public figures in Slovenia and the earlier positions taken by Macedonian politicians. Such considerations and fragmentation lead to the notion that Yugoslavia is in danger of further corrosion. The Serbian nation cannot meekly await the future in such a state of uncertainty. Therefore, all of the nations within Yugoslavia must be given the opportunity to express their wants and intentions. Serbia would then be able to declare and define her own national interests.

[...] Unless the Serbian nation within Serbia participates on an equal footing in the entire process of decision-making and implementation, Yugoslavia cannot be strong and Yugoslavia's very existence as a democratic, socialist community will be called into question.

An entire period in the development of the Yugoslav community and of Serbia has clearly ended in a historically worn-out ideology, overall stagnation, and ever-more obvious regression in the economic, political, moral, and cultural spheres. Such a situation imperatively requires a profound and well thought-out, rationally-grounded, and decisively-implemented reform of the entire governmental structure and social organisation of the Yugoslav community of nations, and a speedy and beneficial integration into the modern world through social democracy [...]

<http://www.haverford.edu/reig/sells/reports/memorandumSANU.htm>



The SANU Memorandum has been criticised (especially outside Serbia) as being a political platform for Serbian nationalism and for the wars launched and waged in the last decade of the 20th century by Slobodan Milošević. It is perceived as the programme espousing the idea of creating a Greater Serbian state, as a demand to revise the inter-republican borders, as exaggerating the problems of Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, as comparing the status of Serbs in Yugoslavia in the eighties with the one they had during the

Fascist occupation and Ustasha rule. The authors denied that the Memorandum was, in any way, a programme, claiming that it was a working document leaked to the public to serve for the condemnation of the Serbian intellectual elite.

 Try to figure out why the text claims that Tito had tried to limit the Serbian influence in Communist Yugoslavia? Was this determined by the experience of the tensions generated by the Pan-Serb policies in the interwar period? Was the resentment of the members of the Serbian Academy justified? According to your knowledge, was their perception shared by the representatives of the other Yugoslav republics?

IV–15. Position of a Slovene about the language issue in Communist Yugoslavia (1987)

Relations in Yugoslavia would certainly be ideal if the Slovenes knew Serbo-Croatian, perhaps even Serbian and Croatian as separate languages, and possibly also Macedonian; if the Serbs and Croats knew Slovene and Macedonian; and if the Macedonians knew one or two languages in addition to their own. In practice, the Slovenes do try to maintain such a relationship. For example, Slovene children learn the Serbo-Croatian language in elementary schools as a compulsory subject. Serbs and Croats, however, do not usually learn the Slovene language in elementary school. This means that we unconsciously apply for the principle [of language equality] one-sidedly. Slovene is a second class language in Yugoslavia, a fact that is confirmed by a superficial survey of the situation and about which are thousands of anecdotes. Serbs and Croats are aware that knowledge of the Slovene language is not a strict necessity for them. Their contacts with Slovenes teach them that Slovenes are willing to speak to them in their own language on most occasions. I imagine that a Croat or Serb presented with the thought that he should learn Slovene asks himself the very logical question: “Why should I learn Slovene when I can use this time to learn a language that could be used for something more

urgent, which presses on me in daily life, and on which my prosperity and progress depends?”

Many Slovenes, especially those working in federal jobs, think that knowledge of Serbo-Croatian is their moral obligation, in the hope that by their example they will convince other citizens that they should learn Slovene. I think that this view is wrong, and that in the end Slovenes should ask themselves, as others do: “Why should I learn Serbo-Croatian if I could use this time to learn some more important language? Why should not Slovenes learn English, German, or Russian, instead of Serbo-Croatian?”

The answer lies in fear, which has been characteristic of Slovenes for a thousand years. Imagine a Slovene abroad in a diplomatic delegation or in the army. Suddenly he finds that he is completely alone before an assembly of Serbo-Croatian-speaking representatives of the country. The only possible conclusion is that he stands before [representatives of] a *Serbo-Croatian – speaking country*, not individual representatives of the Serbian or Croatian nations. The language question becomes a question of patriotism and even ultimately of treason. [...]

And now one of the most important questions arises: How is it possible to speak face to face with the state if you are overwhelmed with fear? Everyone has had such experiences. Before the commander, the governor, the strict teacher – sooner or later you can only stammer. Slovenes stammer in the Yugoslav language. Only at home can they speak fluently, in the family and in home institutions.

The principle that says people in multifunctional states become equal if they know two or more languages is thus shown to be disputable. It can be adhered to in a one-sided manner, and even this one-sided respect of the principle is not free from inner contradictions. In saying this, we have also said that Yugoslavia is not a country of equal nations and languages and that, considering the practicalities, it cannot become one.

The language problem [...] do [es] not mean that the Slovene national question starts with the language issue.

Stokes, p.283-284.



What do you think of the dissatisfaction of the Slovene with respect to the asymmetry of relations in the outwardly equalitarian Federal Yugoslavia? Could there have been any practical solution to this issue?

IV-16. The May Declaration of the Slovenian Democratic Association (1989)

The signers of this declaration make the following statement:

1. We want to live in a sovereign state of the Slovenian nation.
2. As a sovereign state, we want to be able to determine by ourselves any associations with the South Slav or other nations within the reformed Europe.

With respect to the historical aspirations for political independence of the Slovenian nation, the Slovenian state can be based upon:

- Respect for human rights and freedoms;
- Democracy which includes political pluralism;
- Social order which will guarantee spiritual and material well-being in accordance with the actual conditions and with the human resources of the citizens of Slovenia.

Repe, p.198.



The May Declaration of 1989 was issued on 8 May 1989, by the first opposition party, 'Slovenska demokratična zveza' (The Slovenian Democratic Association), which won the elections as part of the union with other opposition parties united in the coalition 'Demos' in 1990. The May Declaration was also signed by a number of other opposition parties and groups

IV-17. Soccer and nationalism – a Croatian fan remembers his journey to the game Partizan Belgrade vs. Dinamo Zagreb (1989)

The rumour is that they have prepared some hot sandwiches for us in Belgrade. They shouldn't have bothered. The atmosphere was becoming hot, as

whisky and cognac were disappearing and our tempers were growing. The carriage was exposed to the acoustic terror: "The whole group from Zagreb, their blood is blue and white!"; some national song were also heard, after all, it was the journey to Belgrade, and in these explosive times, the presence of two quite tolerant policemen didn't prevent us from singing a song, which, until recently, had been unthinkable in public: "I'll die for you Dinamo, as Stjepan Radic did for Croats!". You could feel the atmosphere becoming nationally charged, and everything was about Dinamo, Zagreb, Croatia, so when you asked a 22-year old economy student from a well-off family, why he was going to Belgrade when it was dangerous and when he was told to stay home, the future economist said: "We travel because we love our only real Zagreb club, it's to our satisfaction [...]".

We were close to the stadium, and roaring from the stands could be heard, the dominant dome of St. Sava temple was glowing over the peaks of this Partizan colossus. The South was crowded with 'grave-diggers', undertakers, or whatever they are called, full of banners, in emotional delirium. A separate part was cleared for the guests from Zagreb, with no possibility of any contact. Shouts from the Partizan: "Partizan, Partizan, the real team, Slobodan Milosevic is proud of it!". But insults did not fly in the amounts we were used to during these last few years.

www.badblueboys.hr



Identities are often expressed through the support of particular sports teams. In societies where the open acknowledgement of national sentiments is prohibited, as was the case with Communist Yugoslavia, the allegiance to particular football clubs was a means of expressing one's national identity. Out of the four strongest football clubs in Yugoslavia, two were from Croatia, and two from Serbia. "Bad Blue Boys" supported Dinamo Zagreb, "Torcida" were the fans of Hajduk (Split), Delije ("brave men"), the fans of Red Star (Belgrade) and Grobari ("grave-diggers") the fans of Partizan (Belgrade). The fights among football fans became fiercer in the run up to the fall of Yugoslavia, and culminated in 1990 on the occasion of a match between Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade.



Why do you think that football as a means of expressing national identity became so important? Why did the fans refer to Stjepan Radic and to Slobodan Milosevic?

Describe national conflicts at recent football championships. Do you think that football clubs can express identities other than national ones, e.g. local identities, which can be equally incompatible? Find some examples from your country.

IV–18. The writer Dubravka Ugresic deplors the divisions and wars of the 1990s

Have I ever asked myself to what degree I am a product of the years-long work in the system I have been living in, and to what degree I am a product of my own? And now, I am nobody, just a number without an identity, anonymous human flesh in the hands of the warlords, am I not? For they, the warlords, decide in my name, without asking me, in which state I will live, which language I will write, which culture I will belong to; they decide whether they will give or take the lives of those nearest to me, my friends; whether or not to destroy my towns; and to decide about changing my street name. They are erasing my past and determining my future [...]

Ugresic, p.121.



Dubravka Ugresic (born 1949) is a well-known novelist, who left Croatia in 1993 on account of a disagreement with the overwhelming public opinion on the questions of war and national unity.



What are the feelings expressed by the author? How did the political changes influence the lives of common people? Did politicians think of the ways their decisions could affect people's lives? In this context, can we consider political propaganda as a way for politicians to convince common people that their politics are right?

IV–19. The relation between the Croatian and the Serbian languages – the opinion of the Croatian linguist Stjepan Babic (2003)

When we examine the Croatian and the Serbian language standard, we can easily determine their differences. We might considerably theorise about them, but we'd better keep to the point this time. Let's take an obvious example. When tuning in to radio stations, we hear different languages and we know which is which if we know the language. So we identify Italian, French, Spanish, Russian [...]. In the same way, we discern differences between the Croatian and Serbian language. When we hear on radio station A: (...) "Danas je 30. kolovoza. Meteorolozi najavljuju lijepo i vedro vrijeme" ("It's 30 August. Meteorologists forecast nice and bright weather."), we know that it's Croatian and when we hear on radio station B: (...) "Danas je 30. avgusta. Meteorolozi najavljuju lepo i vedro vreme", we know that it's Serbian.

www.fokus-tjednik.hr



In the 19th century, standard literary 'national' languages emerged from the various dialects spoken in various regions and sub-regions. In the case of the Croats, the 19th century linguists chose the Stokavian dialect from the three main dialects – Stokavian, Kajkavian and Chakavian – as the basis for the common standard language. This dialect was the closest to Serbian, and was, in fact, also the basis of the Serbian standard language. During the time of Communist Yugoslavia (1945-1991), this standard language was often called Serbo-Croatian (or Croato-Serbian), and it was often argued that the Serbs and Croats actually shared the same language, just using different alphabets. During the demise of Yugoslavia and the formation of the new nation-states, the idea that Croatian and Serbian were two completely different languages prevailed, and some people even identified a separate Bosnian language.



What is the real opinion of the linguist Babic on the Croatian–Serbian language dispute? Look closely at the two quotations? What do you think of the concrete differences in the two sentences? Do they justify the statement that we have to cope with two different languages?

IV-20. Reactions to the screening in Croatia of a Serbian film with Croatian subtitles (1999)

'Vezite se, polecemo' ('Fasten your belts, we're taking off'), says the hero from the screen and below is written: 'Vezite se, polijecemo'. Precisely. Then: 'Beograd, jesen 1991' ('Belgrade, the autumn of 1991') appears on the screen in Latin alphabet and below it the Latin subtitle explains: 'Beograd, jesen 1991'. Madness erupts in the cinema. Laughter, tears of joy and enthusiastic clapping on the knees, and not even the first minute of the film has passed. Without a doubt, this is the craziest accomplishment in the history of film; it might perhaps be compared to the beginnings of the American silent comedies. Of course, this is 'Wounds and Subtitles', the first Serbian film in the official and sovereign Croatian film distribution. [...] all the rest is already a legend.

Jukic, in *Feral Tribune*, 707, 5 April, 1999.



What can you conclude about the Croatian-Serbian language issue? Why is it important to national identity? Is the matter of language exclusively the concern of linguists, or do non-experts also have the right to deal with it? Why does the issue of the Croatian-Serbian language lead to funny situations?

IV-21. The split identity of a young woman in Croatia

I don't like losers. Outsiders and people who have to smile. And be polite. Neither do I like Serbs in Croatia. When they said 'Babic', they always add 'from Korcula'. And they are not from Korcula, but from

Dalmatinska Zagora. From f-----g backwoods where Babic is something else. OK, there are Babic Croats, too. But a Babic Croat never explains. And he doesn't add 'from Korcula'. [...]

Still, some people are Serbs, and they feel like Serbs. They think it's normal to be a Serb. You know. Mother Serb, grandpa buried on the Serbian cemetery in Benkovac where in the high grass something is written in the Cyrillic alphabet on his gravestone, they have their family patron-Saint's day, their priests are hairy and they are allowed to get married... And when a little Serb is born he is named Alimpije or Sava or Tanasije. And the little Serbian boy and a Serbian girl Leposava know that they are Serbs since their birth. Everything is clear to them. They may sometimes say that they are 'from Korcula' but they know they are not. Do you get it? But in my case, the trouble is that I am not Serb. And I have to add 'Korcula'. I am not Serb! Now, this minute I would most gladly stand up and shout in the darkness: 'I am not Serb'.

Rudan, pp.14-15.



This text is a fragment from the novel *Ear, Throat, Knife* by Vedrana Rudan (born 1949) – a writer, journalist and real-estate agent. The main character is Tonka Babic, the child of a Croat mother and a Serbian father.



Describe the identity problems of Tonka Babik. What are Tonka's national feelings? How can you explain that a "Babic-Croat" has no need to give an additional explanation for his origin, but that a "Babic-Serb" does? Have you heard of similar situations of split national identity in your country?

IVc. Overcoming nationalism?

IV-22. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995)

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the "Parties"),

Recognising the need for a comprehensive settlement to bring an end to the tragic conflict in the region,

Desiring to contribute toward that end and to promote an enduring peace and stability,

Affirming their commitment to the Agreed Basic Principles issued on September 8, 1995, the Further Agreed Basic Principles issued on September 26, 1995, and the cease-fire agreements of September 14 and October 5, 1995,

Noting the agreement of August 29, 1995, which authorised the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to sign, on behalf of the Republika Srpska, the parts of the peace plan concerning it, with the obligation to implement the agreement that is reached strictly and consequently,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties shall conduct their relations in accordance with the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act and other documents of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In particular, the Parties shall fully respect the sovereign equality of one another, shall settle disputes by peaceful means, and shall refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise, against the territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State.

Article II

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the military aspects of the peace settlement and aspects of regional stabilisation, as set forth in the Agreements at Annex 1-A and Annex 1-B. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfilment of the commitments made

in Annex 1-A, and shall comply fully with their commitments as set forth in Annex 1-B.

Article III

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the boundary demarcation between the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 2. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfilment of the commitments made therein.

Article IV

The Parties welcome and endorse the elections programme for Bosnia and Herzegovina as set forth in Annex 3. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfilment of that programme.

Article V

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as set forth in Annex 4. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfilment of the commitments made therein.

Article VI

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the establishment of an arbitration tribunal, a Commission on Human Rights, a Commission on Refugees and Displaced Persons, a Commission to Preserve National Monuments, and Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations, as set forth in the Agreements at Annexes 5-9. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfilment of the commitments made therein.

Article VII

Recognizing that the observance of human rights and the protection of refugees and displaced persons are of vital importance in achieving a lasting peace, the Parties agree to and shall comply fully with the provisions concerning human rights set forth in Chapter One of the Agreement at Annex 6, as well as the provisions concerning refugees and displaced persons set forth in Chapter One of the Agreement at Annex 7.

Article VIII

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the implementation of this peace settlement, including in particular those pertaining to the civilian (non-military) implementation, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 10, and the international police task force, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 11. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfilment of the commitments made therein.

Article IX

The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Annexes to this Agreement, or which are otherwise authorised by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.

Article X

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognise each other as sovereign independent States within their international borders. Further aspects of their mutual recognition will be subject to subsequent discussions.

Article XI

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

DONE at Paris, this 14 day of December, 1995, in the Bosnian, Croatian, English and Serbian languages, each text being equally authentic.

http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379



The peace agreement which ended the Bosnian War of 1992-1995 was negotiated in Dayton (U.S.A), but the final act was signed in Paris, with the representatives of the European Union Special Negotiator, as well as representatives of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America as witnesses. Most of the concrete provisions of the agreement are detailed in the 12 annexes.

IV-23. Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourhood (1996)**Article 1**

- (1) The Republic of Hungary and Romania (hereinafter referred to as "the Contracting Parties") will base their relations on confidence, cooperation and mutual respect.

[...]

Article 3

- (1) The Contracting Parties confirm that they shall, in their mutual relations, refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other Contracting Party, as well as from any actions which are inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act. They shall also refrain from supporting such actions and they shall not allow a third party to use their territory for conducting similar actions against the other Contracting Party.
- (2) The Contracting Parties shall settle any dispute arising between them exclusively by peaceful means.

Article 4

The Contracting Parties confirm that, in accordance with the principles and norms of international law and the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, they shall respect the inviolability of their common border and the territorial integrity of the other Party. They further confirm that they have no territorial claims on each other and that they shall not raise any such claims in the future.

Article 5

- (1) The Contracting Parties shall, with the view to implementing the purposes of this Treaty, establish an appropriate framework for cooperation in all fields of mutual interest. [...]

Article 7

- (1) The Contracting Parties will broaden their relations and cooperation in international organisations, including regional and sub-regional organisations. They shall mutually support each

other's efforts aimed at integration to the European Union, NATO and the Western European Union.

[...]

Article 14

The Contracting Parties shall promote the climate of tolerance and understanding among their citizens of different ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic origin. They condemn xenophobia and all kind of manifestations based on racial, ethnic or religious hatred, discrimination and prejudice and will take effective measures in order to prevent any such manifestation.

Article 15

- (1) a) In regulating the rights and duties of persons belonging to national minorities living on their territories, the Contracting Parties undertake to apply *the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe for the protection of national minorities*, if more favourable provisions concerning the rights of persons belonging to national minorities do not exist in their domestic legislation.
- b) Without prejudice to the contents of the preceding paragraph, the Contracting Parties shall, with the aim of protecting and developing the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the Hungarian minor-

ity in Romania and the Romanian minority in Hungary, apply as legal obligations the provisions defining the rights of persons belonging to such minorities as contained in the documents of the United Nations, the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, listed in the *Annex* of this Treaty.

[...]

Article 19

- (1) The Contracting Parties shall support and facilitate direct contact between their citizens.
- (2) The Contracting Parties shall extend their consular relations and will simplify border crossing and custom control, including the opening of new border crossing points and the enlargement of the existing ones to the extent of their possibilities, in order to facilitate the traffic of persons and goods. They will conclude appropriate agreements for this purpose.

<http://www.htmh.hu/dokumentumok/asz-ro-e.htm>



List the major provisions on security and 'high policy' issues in the Romanian-Hungarian treaty of 1996. Were stipulations concerning the life of common people included? What do you think about the latter stipulations? Were they justified?

IV-24. Assessment based on a personal experience of the relations between Romanians and Hungarians in areas of mixed populations (2001)

	Conflict exists	Cooperation exists	Not relevant issue & no answer
Ethnic Romanians (overall)	3%	20%	77%
Ethnic Romanians living in Transylvania	5%	46%	49%
Ethnic Hungarians	6%	70%	24%

http://www.intercultural.ro/carti/interculturalitate_detaliu_capitol2-1.html#mirceakivu



What conclusions can we draw from the results of this opinion poll? What do you think of the fact that the people living in mixed areas in Transylvania considered, to a larger extent than the national average (which, to a large extent, included people from more distant parts of Romania) that the relations between Romanians and Hungarians were good?

IV-25. The Ohrid Framework Agreement that ended the armed conflict in FYR of Macedonia (2001)

The following points comprise an agreed framework for securing the future of Macedonia's democracy and permitting the development of closer and more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community. This Framework will promote the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society while respecting the ethnic identity and the interests of all Macedonian citizens.

Basic Principles

- 1.1. The use of violence in pursuit of political aims is rejected completely and unconditionally. Only peaceful political solutions can assure a stable and democratic future for Macedonia.
- 1.2. Macedonia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the unitary character of the State are inviolable and must be preserved. There are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues.
- 1.3. The multi-ethnic character of Macedonia's society must be preserved and reflected in public life.
- 1.4. A modern democratic state in its natural course of development and maturation must continually ensure that its Constitution fully meets the needs of all its citizens and comports with the highest international standards, which themselves continue to evolve.
- 1.5. The development of local self-government is essential for encouraging the participation of citizens in democratic life, and for promoting respect for the identity of communities.

http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/framework_agreement.pdf



The Framework Agreement ended, with international mediation, the armed conflict in the FYR of Macedonia. Signed by the Macedonian president and by the leaders of all major political parties, the agreement foresaw the introduction of a series of Constitutional Amendments and concrete legislative changes in order to safeguard the rights of the Albanians and other minorities. As a result of the Framework

Agreement, the country has moved towards becoming a citizen state, thereby highlighting its multiethnic and multicultural character.

IV-26. Sport as a way of overcoming nationalism. Greek Cypriots supporting a local Turkish Cypriot football team (2003)

There is a bit more to say about Afania³⁵. The village has a football team playing in the first division in the north, dangerously near the bottom of the league table and which might fall to the second division next year. In a couple of days, it will play a very crucial match, which will determine whether it shall stay in the first division or not. The Greek Cypriots from Afania, being refugees for 29 years, decide that they will go in large numbers to support their co-villagers and cheer for them in that crucial game. They even put an announcement in the Greek Cypriot press, urging every Greek Cypriot from Afania to go...

Report, 46, p.27.



What kind of solidarity does the text express? Compare it with text IV-17. What do you notice?

IV-27. Two opinions about the opening of the Green Line between the Greek and Turkish parts of Cyprus (23 April 2003)

A. THE ASSESSMENT OF NICOS ANASTASIOU, POSTED ON THE INTERNET

Nothing will be the same again after yesterday. More than 2,000 Turkish Cypriots and more than 1,000 Greek Cypriots crossed from one side to the other, while many politicians just watched, unable to process, in their own narrow "universe", the enormity of what was happening. For the first time since 1974, the same people who put all these restrictions on us started to lift them. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots went from one side to the other, going anywhere they wanted, visiting their towns and villages, finding dear long-lost friends, without any police to follow them or ask them questions. Everywhere they

³⁵ Afania, a village whose Greek Cypriot population left in 1974, now inhabited entirely by Turkish Cypriots.

went, there was joy and welcoming and laughter and tears of happiness. Yes, everywhere! The citizens are really ahead of the politicians. What is happening is, of course, not the lasting political solution that is needed. But is a powerful catalyst for a solution.

Report, 46, p.26.

B. A TURKISH TEACHER FROM FAMAGUSTA DESCRIBES THE VISIT OF A GREEK-CYPRIO FAMILY (2003)

Today we had a couple as guests from the other side. It seemed that, like many Greeks and Turks [from Cyprus], they wanted to make use of the opportunity to visit the places they were born and passed part of their lives. They wished to feel the joy of being on an undivided island and to share the emotions that were always alive in their hearts.

They did not come to our house, but their car stopped just at the corner, seemingly asking the address of the street that had long ago been given a new name. But the residents in the quarter instantly remembered the old name, Mozart Street. My wife and I happened to be at the gate. [...] The lady, Eleni, whose name we later learned, said: "My grandma used to live in a cottage here; I just wanted to come and see that cottage. Its memory is still vivid in my mind. My grandmother used to bring me here and I used to play under the trees. There were two palm trees here". [...] The years were merciless; the cottage had fallen as a result of the lack of attention. But the palm tree was still there. [...]

We invited them to our house. [...] As the Cypriots that we are, it did not take more than a minute to get to know each other.

Then Eleni unfolded her story. [...] "I heard the news on the radio. The barricades were to be lifted. I had a strong urge in my heart to come and see my grandmother's cottage. I have sweet memories of it. I asked my doctors to allow me, to give me leave, to visit my grandmother's house. [...]"

He [Nicolas] explained: "I watched your demon-

strations. The voices and shouts of the people, 'Irimi', 'peace for all Cypriots', 'Cyprus is the home of Turks and Greeks alike'. The words still echo in my ears". He continued, "I could not hide my feelings any more. I wept. I wept for all of us. I wept and cursed all those who kept the Cypriots apart. We did not deserve this".

His last words will always burn like a fire in my heart.


Report, 46, p.25.



What attitude of the common people towards politics and politicians do the texts reflect? Comment on Nicolas's statement: "We did not deserve this". Can common people play a part in overcoming nationalism? How?

Do you know of any other examples of divided countries or cities in 20th century Europe?

► **v30. Separation line ('Green Line') dividing Nicosia (2003)**



Concluding question:

If, in the past, nationalism was strengthened by educational means, can you think of a way to ease national tensions in the future?